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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., 
an Iowa partnership; TOM 
BROWN; and BROWN'S GENERAL 
OFFICES, an Iowa corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
-vs-
JON OLCH, JANET OLCH, HENRY 
SIGG and 33 0 MAIN STREET 
PARTNERS, 
Defendants/Appellees 
JON OLCH, JANET OLCH, HENRY 
SIGG and 330 MAIN STREET 
PARTNERS, 
Counterclaimants, 
•vs-
BROWN'S SHOE FIT CO., an 
Iowa partnership; BROWN'S 
SHOE FIT CO., an Iowa 
corporation; TOM BROWN; 
BROWN'S GENERAL OFFICES, an 
Iowa corporation; and 
JOHN DOES 2-5, 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Case No. 970199-CA 
(Priority 15) 
Counterdefendants. 
I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2(a)-3(2)(j). 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON CROSS APPEAL 
1. Did the district court commit error in dismissing 330 
Partners' Counterclaim for abuse of process where there was 
substantial evidence that Brown's commenced this action for an 
improper purpose, knowing it would not have agreed to lease the 
Property under the terms of the Basic Lease Provisions document 
which Brown's claims was breached by 330 Partners? [Preservation 
in Record: R. 1125, 1319-25]. 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
None. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceedings. 
Appellants Brown Shoe Fit Company, Tom Brown and Brown's 
General Office (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Brown's") 
commenced this action seeking to enforce as a binding lease 
agreement a one-page document entitled "Basic Lease Provisions" 
that did not contain all of the basic terms of a lease and 
expressly contemplated that the parties would attempt to negotiate 
a final lease for Brown's Shoe Fit Company to lease the premises 
located at 340 Main Street, Park City, Utah from Defendant 330 Main 
Street Partners ("330 Partners").1 Brown's sought specific 
performance or, in the alternative, damages. Brown's also asserted 
a purported claim for fraud. Defendants 33 0 Partners, Jon Olch, 
Janet Olch and Henry Sigg filed a Counterclaim for abuse of process 
and fraud. 
The trial was scheduled for June 11, 1996. On June 6, 
1996, a hearing was held before Judge Pat B. Brian to discuss the 
issues that would be decided by the court and the issues that would 
be decided by the jury. [R. 1543] . At that time, Judge Brian 
determined to hold a hearing at the commencement of trial on June 
11, 1996 to argue and decide various legal matters, including 
whether Plaintiffs' claims should go to the jury or be decided by 
The street address of the property was originally thought to be 330 Main Street. Hence the name 
330 Main Street Partners. 
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the court and whether there were any disputed material facts 
concerning those claims that had to be tried. [R. 1568-70] . Both 
sides understood that the hearing on June 11, 1996 would 
effectively be a summary judgment hearing. [R. 1558-70] . 
At the commencement of trial on June 11, 1996, Judge Brian 
held a hearing on the legal issues. After substantial argument, 
Judge Brian dismissed with prejudice Brown's specific performance 
claim, its fraud claim and its claims for breach of contract to the 
extent of the two three-year option periods referenced in the Basic 
Lease Provisions. Judge Brian reserved on the issue of whether the 
Basic Lease Provisions was an enforceable agreement for the initial 
three year term and ruled he would submit that issue to the jury. 
[R. 1345, 1426]. 
After a recess, Brown's stipulated that the breach of 
contract claim for the initial three-year term of the lease could 
also be dismissed with prejudice because it was Brown's position 
that if it only had the initial three-year term of the lease it 
would lose money. Under the stipulation, if Brown's were to be 
successful on this appeal in overturning Judge Brian's dismissal 
of the breach of contract claim as to the option periods, Brown's 
could refile the breach of contract claim as to the initial three-
year term. [R. 1267-69]. Judge Brian also dismissed Defendants' 
Counterclaim for abuse of process and fraud. 
Thereafter, in October and November, 1996, extensive 
hearings were held on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
which were entered by the court, together with an Order of 
Dismissal, on December 12, 1996. Brown's filed a Notice of Appeal 
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on December 12, 1996. 33 0 Partners filed a Notice of Cross Appeal 
of the court's dismissal of the abuse of process Counterclaim on 
December 18, 1996. [R. 1432, 1438], 
B. Statement of Facts. 
1. 330 Partners is a general partnership organized and 
existing under the laws of the State of Utah. Defendants Jon Olch, 
Janet Olch and Henry Sigg are partners in that partnership. [R. 
983-84] . 
2. Appellant Brownfs Shoe Fit Company is a purported 
partnership organized to operate a shoe store in Park City, Utah. 
[R. 1419] } 
3. Appellants Tom Brown and Brown's General Offices 
purport to be two partners in the partnership. [R. 1419]. 
4. Prior to March, 1989, Tom Brown engaged in certain 
preliminary discussions with Henry Sigg for Mr. Brown to lease the 
Property from 330 Partners for the operation of a Brown's Shoe Fit 
store. [R. 250, 493]. 
5. On March 18, 1984, Brown's Shoe Fit, Tom Brown and 330 
Partners executed a document entitled "Basic Lease Provisions" (the 
"BLP") setting forth certain terms the parties had agreed to as 
part of the negotiations for a lease of the Property. The BLP 
provided for an initial three-year term and then two three-year 
At the time the Basic Lease Provisions document was signed, Tom Brown and Brown's General Offices 
intended to solicit certain third parties to become partners in the partnership, but no partners ever invested. 
[R. 866-67, 8693. 
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option periods. The BLP provided for a basic rent per square foot 
and for a percentage rent based upon "gross volume." The BLP 
contained a square footage rate for the option periods, but did not 
contain an agreed upon percentage rent for the option periods. 
Instead, the BLP specifically provided that prior to the 
commencement of each option period the parties would "agree on the 
gross volume figure from which to base additional rent during each 
year" of that option period. [R. 67] . Finally, the BLP 
specifically provided that the terms agreed upon therein were "to 
be incorporated into a final lease document executed by both 
parties." [R. 67]. 
6. Tom Brown's intent when he signed the BLP was "[t]o 
firm up and have a written document reflecting the negotiations up 
to this point." Mr. Brown acknowledged that further negotiations 
were contemplated and that he considered the BLP to be an agreement 
to be incorporated into a future lease. [R. 874, 878-79]. 
7. On March 28, 1994, ten days after the BLP was signed, 
Tom Brown sent a memo to prospective partners in the Park City 
store in which he stated: 
There is still a lot of things that have to be worked 
out with the landlord, but it looks like it is going 
to be a go. 
Mr. Brown acknowledged that one of the things that had to be worked 
out with the landlord was a final lease agreement. [R. 867-68]. 
8. The BLP contained conflicting provisions about whether 
there would be a cost of living increase during the first option 
period. Moreover, the document did not provide which cost of 
living index would apply during either option period. [R. 67]. 
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9. The BLP did not contain a lease commencement date. [R. 
67] . 
10. At the time the BLP was signed on March 18, 1994, no 
building existed on the Property. In fact, construction had not 
even been commenced, no governmental approvals had been obtained 
and final plans for the building had not been completed. [R. 791] . 
11. Architectural plans for the building were not 
completed until on or about June 20, 1994. The plans were 
submitted to the Park City Planning Staff on or about June 29, 
1994. A building permit application was filed September 23, 1994. 
[R. 791]. 
12. A construction contract for the construction of the 
building was signed November 18, 1994. Park City issued a ground 
breaking permit on November 20, 1994, a footings and foundation 
permit on December 19, 1994 and a full building permit on March 16, 
1995. [R. 791-92]. 
13. Construction of the building on the Property commenced 
in November, 1994. Construction was completed in December, 1995, 
a full 21 months after the BLP was executed. A Temporary 
Certificate of Occupancy was issued on December 22, 1995. [R. 
792] . 
14. On August 5, 1994, Jon Olch sent a letter to Tom 
Brown, stating his position that the BLP was not a binding 
agreement, but indicating a willingness to attempt to work out an 
agreeable lease with Brown's. [R. 882]. 
15. By letter dated August 12, 1994, Brown's attorney, 
Thomas D. Green, wrote Jon Olch disagreeing that the BLP was not 
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a binding document, but indicating a willingness to work out a 
lease agreement for the Property. [R.885]. 
16. During the fall of 1994 and early 1995, the parties 
exchanged correspondence and drafts of lease agreements for the 
Property, but no final lease agreement was ever agreed to by the 
parties. [R. 80-83, 45-66, 1-14]. 
17. Brown's attorney, Thomas Green, reviewed the 
Defendants1 original proposed lease on behalf of Brown's. By 
letter dated October 27, 1994, he demanded over thirty changes in 
the proposed lease. Tom Brown testified that Brown's would not 
sign the lease unless all of the changes demanded in that letter 
were made. [R. 82, 39-44, 875]. 
18. The parties did not agree on a number of important 
provisions to be included in the lease, including: 
(a) The lease commencement date; 
(b) Whether Brown's should be limited to the 
operation of a shoe store on the premises or whether 
Brown's should be entitled to sell other clothing apparel; 
(c) Whether 330 Partners should be prohibited from 
leasing other space in the building to a tenant selling the 
same type of items; 
(d) What the definition of what "gross sales" should 
be; 
(e) Whether Brown's should be prohibited from 
assigning or subletting the Property; 
(f) What insurance Brown's should be required to 
carry; 
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(g) What the parties' rights would be in the event 
of condemnation; 
(h) Whether Brown's should be required to put up a 
letter of credit to secure one year's rent or whether 
Brownf s should only be required to put up a two month 
security deposit; and 
(i) What Brown's obligations would be in the event 
of default. [R. 1-67]. 
19. Most importantly, as stated above, the parties did not 
agree in the BLP on what the gross volume threshold for calculating 
percentage rent during the option periods would be. Despite the 
fact that the BLP provided that the parties would agree on the 
gross volume threshold prior to the commencement of each option 
term, Brown's attempted to require 330 Partners to agree on that 
threshold before Brown's would sign a lease. On the other hand, 
33 0 Partners simply proposed in accordance with the specific 
language of the BLP that the threshold would be agreed to prior to 
commencement of the first and second option periods. Brown's also 
sought a provision designed to insure that the rent during the 
option periods would not exceed then current fair rental value of 
the Property. 33 0 Partners took the position that the rent during 
the option periods would be higher to compensate it for the lower 
than market rental rate during the initial term. Brown's expert 
conceded that is an appropriate goal for a landlord. [R. 882-84, 
887, 945-46, 947-952, 962-64] . 
20. Brown's was unwilling to lease the Property if all it 
had was a binding agreement for a three-year lease. Brown's 
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required a final binding agreement for two three-year option 
periods in order to lease the Property. [R. 925-27] . At the 
hearing at the commencement of trial on June 11, 1996, Brown's 
stipulated that the following testimony of Tom Brown was true and 
accurately reflected Brown's position: 
Q. So I take it that at the end of the day you 
were prepared to sign a lease if all the term was, was 
three years, no options; is that true? 
A. No. 
Q. In order to sign a lease you required at 
least two option periods of three years each? 
A. Yes. 
Page 57, MR. VAN DAM: Go ahead. 
Line 4, THE WITNESS: No, I wouldn't have done 
it strictly on three years. 
Q. (BY MR. BURBIDGE) I just ask, why not? 
A. Because if you need to depreciate your items 
and this sort of thing, you don't even get a run at 
it in three years. 
Q. So you would end up losing money? 
A. Losing money. [R. 1422]. 
21. Brown's conceded that many of the provisions on which 
the parties disagreed were simply normal negotiating items upon 
which the parties could reasonably take different positions. [R. 
917-44, 964-81]. 
22. Brown's expert, Richard A. Robbins, opined that the 
BLP was a typical letter of interest which parties use to attempt 
to obtain financing and that 50% of the time such documents never 
result in a final agreement between the parties. [R. 958-59, 961] . 
23. On October 8, 1993, some months prior to execution of 
the BLP, Tom Brown sent a letter to Henry Sigg indicating an 
interest in leasing the Property. Mr. Brown understood Sigg would 
use that letter for financing purposes. No one told Mr. Brown that 
330 Partners would not use the BLP to assist in obtaining 
financing. [R. 876-77, 991]. 
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V. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The parties did not intend to be bound by the BLP, 
which expressly provided that the terms set forth therein would be 
incorporated in a final lease agreement. Both parties intended 
that unless and until a final lease was negotiated that no 
agreement existed. The parties were unable to agree upon a final 
lease. Brown's attorney demanded over thirty changes in the 
proposed lease submitted by 330 Partners. Tom Brown testified he 
would not sign a lease unless all of those changes were made. 
2. Regardless of the parties' intent, the BLP is not 
enforceable because it is too uncertain and indefinite to be 
enforced. There are numerous terms to which the parties did not 
agree. Most importantly, the parties did not agree to the rent 
during the two option terms. Under Utah law, the failure to agree 
on such rent is fatal to any agreement. 
3. The BLP did not obligate 330 Partners to negotiate a 
lease in good faith. There is no such provision in the BLP nor 
should such an agreement be implied by the court. 
4. Even if a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
implied into the BLP, 330 Partners did, in fact, attempt to 
negotiate a lease in good faith, but the parties were unable to 
agree on a number of terms. Brown's conceded that many of the 
items were normal disagreements between a landlord and tenant. 
5. Brown's suffered no damages as a result of 330 
Partners' alleged failure to negotiate in good faith. Brown's did 
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not intend to perform the BLP. Brownfs was only willing to lease 
the Property if the rental for the two option periods was agreed 
to in advance, an agreement which 33 0 Partners was not obligated 
to make under the BLP. 
6. The trial court properly dismissed Brown's claims for 
specific performance. The BLP was far too indefinite and uncertain 
to be the subject of specific performance. Further, Brown's did 
not join the present tenants on the Property who were indispensable 
parties. 
7. The trial court correctly dismissed Brownfs General 
Offices1 claim to recover money it allegedly would have earned 
under a management agreement with Brown's Shoe Fit. This item of 
special damage was not pled in the Complaint. Nor was Brown's 
General Offices a third party beneficiary of the BLP. And, Brown's 
General Offices was not a party to the agreement, but was simply 
a partner in Brown's Shoe Fit, which signed the BLP. 
8. The court properly determined that the facts set forth 
in Finding No. 12 were undisputed based upon the record before the 
court, including the undisputed documents attached to Brown's 
Complaint and the deposition testimony of Tom Brown and his 
attorney, Thomas Green. 
9. The court properly dismissed Brown's fraud claim. 
There was no misrepresentation of a presently existing fact because 
there was no evidence that 33 0 Partners did not intend to attempt 
to negotiate a final lease incorporating the terms of the BLP. 
Further, because the terms of the BLP were so vague, uncertain and 
incomplete, Brown's could not have reasonably relied upon that 
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document. Brown's further could not have reasonably relied upon 
the document because it did not intend to comply with its terms. 
And, Brown's was not damaged by any supposed misrepresentation 
because it did not intend to perform the BLP unless Brown's could 
negotiate an agreement for the amount of rent to be paid during the 
two option periods. The BLP did not obligate 330 Partners to make 
such an agreement, but only provided that the parties would 
negotiate the amount of rent during the option periods prior to 
the commencement of each option period. 
10. The trial court erred in dismissing 330 Partners' 
Counterclaim for abuse of process. There was substantial evidence 
that Brown's filed this action for damages or specific performance 
with respect to the BLP knowing that Brown's would not perform the 
BLP in order to attempt to exact a lease from 33 0 Partners to which 
33 0 Partners was not obligated to agree or to force 330 Partners 
to pay Brown's money to settle the lawsuit. 
VI. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE BLP DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BINDING AGREEMENT, BUT WAS 
SIMPLY PART OF THE PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND 
IS TOO UNCERTAIN TO BE ENFORCED. 
1. The Parties Did Not Intend the BLP To Be a Binding 
Lease. 
Brown's attempted to elevate the BLP signed by Tom Brown 
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and Henry Sigg on March 19, 1994 to the status of a binding lease 
agreement between the parties. This assertion is without merit as 
a matter of law. Not only is this position inconsistent with the 
legal authorities, but it is inconsistent with the testimony of Tom 
Brown and Brown's expert, Richard A. Robbins. 
The cases are uniform that if the parties do not intend to 
be bound until a final agreement is prepared and signed, no 
agreement exists until that is accomplished. See, e.a., Arnold 
Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 587 (6th 
Cir. 1976); Itek Corporation v. Chicago Aerial Industries, Inc., 
248 A.2d 625, 629 (Del. 1968); Scheck v. Francis, 260 N.E.2d 493, 
494 (N.Y. 1970). 
This Court's decision in Crismon v. Western Co. of North 
America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987), is directly on point. In 
Crismon, the tenant sent a letter to the landlord dated January 11, 
1982 confirming an agreement that the tenant would enter into a 
lease agreement on five duplexes for a five-year term with lease 
payments of $540.00 per unit per month with a 6% annual escalation 
clause and that the landlord would be responsible for basic 
maintenance and management of the units. The tenant stated that 
its legal department would prepare a lease based upon the general 
agreements the parties had reached. 
Shortly thereafter, the tenant began paying rent on two 
units, the construction of which had been completed. The landlord 
then wrote the tenant stating that the terms contained in the 
tenant's letter were acceptable with certain modifications and 
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asking that the tenant respond to the proposed modifications so 
that the parties could "proceed toward a final agreement." The 
parties then exchanged drafts of a final lease agreement, but never 
agreed to all of the terms. 
The trial court held that the tenant's January 11, 1982 
letter did not constitute a binding commitment to lease, but simply 
set forth the preliminary terms and that the landlord and tenant 
had rejected each other's proposed lease. This Court affirmed, 
stating: 
In this case, the language in Eppsf January 11 
letter indicates that the parties were still 
negotiating. The letter states that Western's legal 
department would be sending a prepared lease. That 
statement indicates that both parties understood that 
a binding contract would be entered into in the 
future. Subsequent correspondence between the parties 
also demonstrates that the January 11 letter evidenced 
preliminary negotiations. . . . Finally, the 
subsequent leases exchanged by the parties demonstrate 
that there was no meeting of the minds. Epps sent 
Crismon a lease which Crismon rejected by sending back 
a lease with different terms with regard to term, 
rent, maintenance, insurance and default. The 
parties' exchange of proposed leases clearly 
demonstrates that they did not have a meeting of the 
minds as to all of the essential terms of the lease. 
[742 P.2d at 1222]. 
The facts of Crismon mirror those in the present case. The 
BLP itself specifically states that the terms agreed upon therein 
are "to be incorporated into a final lease document executed by 
both parties." The BLP does not come close to containing all of 
the essential terms of a long-term commercial lease. Tom Brown 
testified his intent in signing the BLP was " [t]o firm up and have 
a written document reflecting the negotiations up to this point." 
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He acknowledged further negotiations were necessary. [R. 874, 878-
79] . Ten days after the BLP was signed, Tom Brown told his 
prospective partners that there were still a number of terms, that 
had to be worked out with 33 0 Partners, but it looked like it 
"would be a go." [R. 867-68, 881]. 
The subsequent negotiations which took place between the 
parties months later in which they could not agree on any number 
of terms demonstrate the lack of an agreement. Brown's attorney 
in his October 27, 1994 demanded over thirty changes in the lease 
proposed by 330 Partners. And, Tom Brown very plainly testified 
in his deposition that he would not sign the lease unless all of 
the changes demanded in that letter were made. [R. 82, 3 9-44, 
875] . 
There were a number of items the parties were not able to 
agree upon in negotiations. Most importantly, there was absolutely 
no agreement on the percentage rent which would be paid by Brovm' s 
during the first and second option periods, nor was there any 
mechanism agreed to for determining that rent. Instead, the 
parties simply provided that prior to the commencement of each 
option term, the parties would agree on the percentage rent for 
that option term. Tom Brown specifically testified that he would 
not lease the Property unless he had a binding agreement to lease 
for the two three-year option periods because otherwise he would 
end up losing money. [R. 1422] . One of the demands made by 
Brownfs attorney in the negotiations was that, contrary to the 
specific provisions of the BLP, 33 0 Partners agree in advance as 
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part of the initial lease what the percentage rent would be during 
the option periods or agree that if the parties could not agree on 
the rent it would be established by appraisers. Brown's attorney 
testified that unless that item was agreed to, he would not 
recommend his clients sign a lease. The attorney acknowledged 
there was no provision in the BLP obligating 330 Partners to agree 
on the percentage rent during the option periods. [R. 925-27]. 
Other terms the parties were unable to agree upon as part 
of the lease negotiations included the lease commencement date, 
what business Brown's would be entitled to conduct on the Property, 
whether other tenants would be prohibited from selling similar 
items as sold by Brown's, whether Brown's could only conduct a shoe 
store or could sell other clothing items, whether there would be 
costs of living escalations during the first option term, which 
cost of living index would be utilized to calculate cost of living 
increases, the definition of "gross sales" from which percentage 
rent would be calculated, the amount of insurance which would be 
required, Brown's right to assign or sublease, the rights of the 
parties in case of the exercise of eminent domain rights, and 
Brown's obligations in case of default. 
It is patently obvious from the foregoing facts, including 
Brown's own testimony, that the parties did not intend to be bound 
by the BLP unless and until they reached a final, binding lease 
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agreement containing numerous additional terms.3 Indeed, Richard 
R. Robbins, the expert retained by Brown's, testified that the BLP 
was a typical letter of intent which parties use to attempt to 
obtain financing and that 50% of the time such documents never 
result in a final agreement between the parties. [R. 958-59, 961]. 
2. Regardless of the Parties' Intent, the BLP Is Not an 
Enforceable Lease. 
The lease contemplated by the parties was for a period of 
more than one year. Therefore, the lease was required to be in 
writing under the statute of frauds. Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-
1. In order for a memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds, it 
must contain all of the essential provisions and terms of the 
agreement. English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P. 2d 613, 616 
(Utah App. 1991) . To be enforced, the memorandum must also set 
forth the obligations of the parties with sufficient definiteness. 
Southlands Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 1988). 
Brown's argues that when Judge Noel denied 330 Partners' Motion for Summary Judgment prior to the 
completion of discovery, he "explicitly ruled the parties' intended 'to be bound' by the" BLP. [Appellants 
Brief, p. 14, n.3]. Brown's concludes without any support whatsoever that this establishes the law of the case. 
This contention is wrong. Initially, Brown's relies for this contention solely upon the contents of an unsigned 
minute entry prepared by the clerk. Neither the proposed order prepared by 330 Partners, nor the proposed order 
prepared by Brown's contains such a ruling. The court did not sign either order. Thus, no such ruling exists. 
See. South Salt Lake v. Burton. 718 P.2d 405 (Utah 1986); State v. Rawlings. 829 P.2d 150, 153 (Utah App. 1992). 
Moreover, a determination made by one judge denying a motion for summary judgment does not establish the law 
of the case prohibiting a second judge from revising the prior ruling. AMS Salt Industries. Inc. v. Magnesium 
Corp. of America. 320 Utah Ad. Rep. 3, 4 (Filed June 24, 1997); Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies. 884 P.2d 1306, 
1311 (Utah App. 1994). And, the denial of a motion without findings or a statement of grounds does not 
establish law of the case. Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen. 801 P.2d 163, 167-68 (Utah App. 1990). In 
point of fact, significant discovery followed the initial motion for summary judgment, and Judge Brian was 
presented with a substantially different record. 
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Even if it is assumed for purposes of argument, contrary 
to what is demonstrated above, that the parties intended the BLP 
to be a binding lease, that document is unenforceable as a matter 
of law at the very least because it does not contain a lease 
commencement date and, more importantly, an agreement on the amount 
of rent to be paid during the first and second option periods. 
First, there is no lease commencement date set forth in the 
BLP nor is there any method set to determine when the lease would 
commence. There is not even any provision obligating 330 Partners 
to complete construction of the building at any specified date. 
Certainly, if Brownfs Shoe were on the other foot, it would argue 
that it could not be bound to a lease for a non-existent building 
to commence some unspecified time in the future after the landlord 
prepared plans for a building, obtained governmental approvals and 
actually completed construction. 
Second, as previously explained, the BLP did not specify 
the percentage rental that Brown's would be obligated to pay during 
the option periods or any mechanism for determining the percentage 
rental. Thus, the rent that Brown's would pay during the option 
periods was left for future agreement. At most, the BLP was an 
agreement to agree in the future. 
Utah law is settled beyond dispute that an option to renew 
a lease is unenforceable unless the rent to be paid, or some 
mechanism for determining the amount of rent, is specified in the 
lease. Thus, in Pingree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc., 558 
P.2d 1317 (Utah 1976), the lessee had an option to renew a lease 
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at a rate to be determined based upon specific factors. The 
parties were not able to agree on the amount of rent for the option 
period. The Utah Supreme Court held that because there was no 
agreement between the parties on the rental rate for the renewal 
term, the lease terminated, explaining: 
The majority rule, in essence, is that a 
provision for the extension or renewal of a lease must 
specify the time the lease is to extend and the rate 
of rent to be paid with such a degree of certainty and 
definiteness that nothing is left to future 
determination. If it falls short of this requirement, 
it is not enforceable. . . . 
In the current matter, the court implied the 
parties had agreed on a reasonable rental figure, 
which the court proceeded to determine. This 
interpretation had the effect of nullifying the 
express factors specified by the parties, and 
substituting a new agreement to which the parties had 
not committed themselves. To attempt by judicial fiat 
to substitute the legal concept of "reasonable rental" 
in lieu of the previously followed design of a 
fluctuating rental, measured by future uncontrolled 
and uncontrollable conditions, would, indeed, be to 
remake the contract for the parties and very possibly 
frustrate what to us appears to be a very important 
contrary intent concerning the rental amount.... 
The option to renew was too vague and indefinite to 
be enforceable and the lease terminated by its own 
terms as of September 30, 1974. [Emphasis added]. 
[558 P.2d at 1321]. 
Brown's attempts to distinguish Pingree on the basis that 
Brown's would have presented evidence of a later oral agreement 
made after the BLP was signed that rent during the option terms 
would be based on fair market value. There was no such contention 
made by Brown's until months after its claims were dismissed when 
the parties were arguing over the findings. Nor was there any 
evidence to support this contention. In fact, 33 0 Partners' 
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position was that it was entitled to charge higher rent during the 
option periods to offset the less than market rent during the 
initial three-year term. [R. 883] . Moreover, the purported oral 
agreement would be barred by the statute of frauds. 
Finally, this purported distinction was rejected by the 
Utah Supreme Court in the later case of Cottonwood Mall Co. v. 
Sine, 767 P.2d 499 (Utah 1988). In Cottonwood Mall, the tenant 
attempted to enforce an alleged oral agreement by the landlord to 
renew a lease "upon reasonable terms." The Utah Supreme Court 
refused to do so, and held that the oral agreement on renewal was 
unenforceable, stating: 
We held [in JPingree] that the option to renew was too 
vague and indefinite to be enforceable and that the 
lease terminated at the end of the original term. 
In so ruling, this court followed what was 
termed the majority rule . . . which was stated to be 
that a provision for the extension or renewal of a 
lease must specify the time the lease is to extend and 
the rate of rent to be paid with such a degree of 
certainty and definiteness that nothing is left to 
future determination. If it falls short of this 
requirement, it is not enforceable. . . . In 
reversing the trial court, this Court expressly 
rejected its attempt to fix a reasonable rent for the 
parties when their negotiations bogged down. 
Defendant would have us now do what we refused 
to do in Pingree. While it is true that defendant 
adduced evidence as to what would be a reasonable 
renewal term and what would be a reasonable rent, the 
trial court properly spurned defendants invitation 
to find or make an agreement where the parties had 
themselves failed. Defendants argue that in Pingree 
the court declined to fix a renewal rent because of 
the difficulty in balancing the several factors which 
the lease required the parties to consider in fixing 
the rent. Here, defendant's argument continues, no 
factors are listed in the lease, and the task is less 
complicated. We do not agree. In determining what 
is "reasonable rent," many factors must be weighed 
and put into the equation. Business judgments must 
be made. . . . Courts simply are not equipped to make 
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monetary decisions impacted by the fluctuating 
commercial world and are even less prepared to impose 
paternalistic agreements on litigants. 
[767 P.2d at 502]. 
In the recent case of Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996), the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed 
continued vitality of the principles set forth in Pinaree and 
Cottonwood Mall. In Tsern, the parties to a lease traded proposals 
for a rent abatement because an elevator in the leased premises was 
inoperable. The trial court found that although the parties had 
not agreed on the amount of an abatement, it could fix a reasonable 
amount because the parties had agreed to the concept of rent 
abatement. The Supreme Court reversed, stating: 
Tsern argues that the trial court erred in 
supplying a requisite term of the proposed 
modification. We agree. . . . The only issue, given 
the trial court's findings, is whether the parties 
agreed on each of the necessary elements of a valid 
modification. We hold that they did not. 
Courts may not impose a modification of a lease 
to which the parties have not agreed and, a fortiori, 
may not do so when the parties have explicitly 
disagreed as to the essential terms thereof. A valid 
modification of a contract or lease requires "a 
meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out, either expressly or impliedly, with 
sufficient definiteness." Modification of such terms 
as the amount of rent must be agreed upon in a 
modification of a lease agreement. As Corbin notes, 
when parties have not agreed on a reasonable price or 
a method for determining one, "the agreement is too 
indefinite and uncertain for enforcement." . 
Barton and Tsern did not agree as to the amount of the 
abatement, either expressly or impliedly. 
[928 P.2d at 373-74] [Citations omitted] [Emphasis added]. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held agreements to 
agree unenforceable in other contexts besides leases. Thus, in 
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Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979), the Court 
stated: 
The Letter of Intent quoted above is not by 
itself an enforceable contract. Nowhere in its forms 
are any binding promises even made; it is precisely 
what it purports to be, a letter indicating the 
intention of the parties to enter into, at a later 
time, a binding agreement. The letter is a variation 
of what is often called a "agreement to agree". Such 
"agreements to agree" are generally unenforceable 
because they leave open material terms for future 
consideration and the courts cannot create these terms 
for the parties. Here the parties simply committed 
themselves to the intention of entering into an 
agreement at a later time. The letter set out certain 
goals of that later agreement, including the formation 
of a corporation. But the letter itself is not a 
binding agreement to create any business entity 
jointly owned by the parties, and indeed, even if it 
could be so construed, it is woefully lacking in the 
requisite specificity required for judicial 
enforcement. As we stated in Valcarce, " . . . where 
there was simply some nebulous notion in the air that 
a contract might be entered in the future, the court 
cannot fabricate the kind of contract the parties 
ought to have made and enforce it." [Emphasis added] . 
See also. Oil Shale Corporation v. Larson, 438 P.2d 540-541 (Utah 
1968); Valcarce v. Bitters, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). 
Brown's cites a number of cases to attempt to escape these 
controlling decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. None of Brown!s 
cases are on point. 
For example, Brown's cites Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P. 2d 857 
(Utah 1979). In that case, plaintiff had orally agreed to purchase 
a house for the defendant and sell it to her within a few months 
for $6,500.00 plus a "fair commission." Plaintiff admitted the 
oral agreement had been made. The Court held this agreement was 
enforceable because the purchase price for the house was definitely 
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stated to be $6,500.00 and where the "main subject matter of a 
contract is definite, an agreement for fixing reasonable 
compensation for some adjunctive service in connection therewith 
does not render the contract so indefinite as to be unenforceable." 
[595 P. 2d 859] . The Court held the plaintiff had breached the 
agreement by refusing to even state to defendant what he would 
accept as a fair commission. Ferris did not involve either a lease 
or the enforceability of a renewal provision. The case was also 
decided several years before the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Cottonwood Mall, in which the Supreme Court again made it 
abundantly clear that a court will not determine for the parties 
a reasonable rental rate during a renewal period. In addition, 
unlike Ferris, there was no agreement in the case at bar that the 
rental rate during the renewal period would be "fair" or 
"reasonable." 
Brown's also mistakenly relies on Reed v. Alvev, 610 P.2d 
1374 (Utah 1980) . In that case, the parties entered into an 
earnest money agreement for the sale of real estate for the sum of 
$70,000.00, which would be payable "upon terms to be arranged." 
The court held that this agreement was enforceable because where 
there are no terms of payment set forth in the agreement, the law 
supplies the missing term by implying that the payment is due in 
full at the time of tender of the conveyance. [610 P.2d at 1378-
79] . 
In Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Utah 1980), cited by 
Brown's, the parties entered into a written earnest money agreement 
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for the purchase by plaintiff on one unimproved lot for $30,000.00 
and for an option on an adjacent lot. Plaintiff made a $100.00 
down payment and tendered a cashier's check for the balance of 
$29,900.00. The defendant refused to sell. The Supreme Court 
merely held that the contract was enforceable because it was 
definite and certain in its essential terms. 
Incredibly, Brown's next contends that Pingree no longer 
reflects current law because it referred in its decision to a 
majority rule about "agreements to agree" and therefore the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Cottonwood Mall and Tsern, which 
"uncritically cited Pingree without considering new laws and legal 
doctrines" should be ignored by this Court. This argument is 
fatuous. 
The Utah Supreme Court in its decision in Pingree did not 
blindly follow any "majority rule." It reached its decision based 
upon a well-reasoned analysis of the applicable law and policy 
considerations. The same is true of the Supreme Court's decisions 
in Cottonwood Mall and Tsern. The Supreme Court's 1996 decision 
in Tsern readopting the very same legal analysis and principles as 
adopted in Pingree, Cottonwood Mall and other earlier decisions 
lays bare Brown's argument that the Supreme Court's prior decisions 
rejecting Brown's position should be ignored. 
Brown's assertion that the majority of courts now enforce 
agreements to agree is wrong. While there certainly is a split of 
authority on this issue and a number of cases have enforced 
agreements to agree based upon the particular facts of those cases 
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(usually where the parties have agreed to a "reasonable rent"). 
That is not a "majority rule." Most courts flatly refuse to 
enforce such agreements or refuse to enforce them unless there is 
a mechanism for determining the rent. See, Riis v. Day, 613 P.2d 
696, 697-98 (Mont. 1980); Joseph Martin Jr. Deli, Inc. v. 
Schumacher, 419 N.Y.S.2d 558, 559 (1979); Farnsworth on Contracts, 
§ 3.29 at p. 219 (2d Ed. 1990). 
Brown1s argues that Utah appellate courts "routinely 
enforce 'agreements to agree,1" ignoring the consistent decisions 
to the contrary. [Appellants' Brief, p. 23]. Brown's would be 
correct if it added the word "not." The authorities cited by 
Brown's for the proposition that this court can enforce the BLP do 
not support that position at all. 
Brown's miscites English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P. 2d 
613 (Utah App. 1991) . English has nothing to do with the issue in 
the present case. In English, the parties orally modified the rent 
due under a written lease which provided the rent was to be 
negotiated every thirty-six months. The tenant then actually paid 
the modified rent for a few months. The landlord admitted the oral 
agreement, but contended the oral agreement was unenforceable under 
the statute of frauds. This Court held only that the written lease 
agreement, together with rental checks that were accepted by the 
landlord, and the correspondence concerning the matter, were 
sufficient writings to satisfy the statute of frauds. This Court 
distinguished Pinaree and Cottonwood Mall on the basis that the 
statute of frauds was not an issue in those cases. 
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Brown's reliance on this Courtfs decision in Republic 
Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994), is 
similarly unavailing. In Republic, this Court held that the 
agreement to pay a reasonable fee for the sale of all the 
defendant's company stock was enforceable in light of the 
relationship between the parties, the fact that they had already 
agreed to a $250,000.00 commission if 22% of the stock was sold and 
because they had also sometime later agreed upon a fee of 
$450,000.00 if all the stock was sold to a party for approximately 
$35,000,000.00. This Court distinguished Pinaree upon the basis 
that in Pinaree the parties had not agreed to a "reasonable11 rent. 
Moreover, to the extent Brown's attempts to interpret Republic as 
allowing this Court to set a "reasonable" rent, Republic would 
directly contradict the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cottonwood 
Mall where the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce an agreement 
for the payment of "reasonable" rent in order to renew a lease. 
In Kier v. Condrack, 478 P.2d 327 (Utah 1970), cited by 
Brown's, the plaintiffs were given an option to purchase the 
seller's home for the sum of $23,500.00 "on payments and terms to 
be negotiated." When the buyer exercised the option, he offered 
to cash out the plaintiffs by paying their equity and assuming the 
balance on two mortgages. Thus, the effect of the offer was to pay 
cash. The sellers rejected the offer, made it clear that they 
would not take cash, and attempted to bargain for a higher price 
by inserting into the agreement a provision that they would retain 
occupancy of the house for one to two years. 
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Finally, Brown's attempt to rely on Valley Lane Corp, v. 
Bowen, 592 P.2d 589 (Utah 1979), is curious. In Valley Lane, the 
parties agreed that if they were unable to agree on renewal rent, 
the rent would be determined by appraisers based on fair market 
value. Thus, the parties agreed to a specific procedure by which 
the rent would be determined -- something that is entirely lacking 
in the BLP, but was many months later proposed by Brown's and 
rejected by 330 Partners.4 
B. THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BROWN'S CLAIM TO SPECIFIC 
PERFORMANCE. 
A claim for specific performance is equitable in nature and 
is to be decided by the court. Judge Brian determined as a matter 
of law that the BLP was too vague and indefinite for him to order 
specific performance. He further refused to order specific 
performance on the basis that the tenants occupying the Property 
had not been joined as parties. [R. 1424]. Judge Brian's decision 
was entirely correct. 
Brown's also asks this Court to borrow from the provisions of Section 78A-2-305 of the Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code which provides that under certain conditions a court can determine a reasonable price for the 
sale of goods where the parties are unable to agree on the price. However, as Brown's concedes, the Uniform 
Commercial Code has absolutely no applicability to a lease of real estate. There is no basis for this court 
to "analogize" the provision of the UCC to a real estate lease, especially in view of the repeated decisions 
of the Utah Supreme Court specifically rejecting Brown's position that this Court can set reasonable rent 
during the option periods. 
28 
1. As a Matter of Law the BLP Was Too Indefinite. 
The legal principle that the terms of an agreement must be 
clear, definite and certain set forth above applies with special 
force when the extraordinary relief of specific performance is 
sought. Candid Productions v. International Skating Union, 53 0 
F.Supp. 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 
491, 493 (Utah 1967), the Utah Supreme Court set forth the 
following requirements for specific performance: 
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, 
and ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture 
or to be supplied by the court. It must be 
sufficiently certain and definite in its terms to 
leave no reasonable doubt as to what the parties 
intended and no reasonable doubt of the specific thing 
equity is called upon to have performed, and it must 
be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the 
court may enforce it as actually made by the parties. 
A greater degree of certainty is required for specific 
performance in equity than is necessary to establish 
a contract as the basis of an action at law for 
damages. [Emphasis added]. 
See also. Southlands Corp. v Potter, 760 P.2d 320, 322 (Utah App. 
1988); Eckard v. Smith, 527 F.2d 660, 662 (Utah 1974) ("specific 
performance cannot be granted unless the terms are clear, and that 
clarity must be found from the language used in the document."); 
Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985); Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 423 P.2d 491, 493 (Utah 1967). 
Because the BLP did not specify the rental during the 
option periods, did not specify the lease commencement date and did 
not contain an agreement on all of the other terms discussed above 
customarily found in a long-term commercial lease upon which the 
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parties were eventually unable to agree, the court!s decision to 
dismiss the specific performance claim was entirely correct. 
Brown's cites the court to Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining 
Co., 242 P.2d 578, 580 (Utah 1952), as proof that the agreement in 
the present case is definite enough to be specifically enforced. 
Birdzell, however, directly refutes Brown's position. In Birdzell, 
the court ruled the purported agreement was not definite enough to 
be enforced because the letter relied upon as the agreement: 
. . . does not state what amount the rent shall 
be but expressly leaves that question open for further 
negotiations. In an oral contract to execute a lease 
for a period longer than one year, the amount of rent 
is clearly one of the essential terms which must 
appear in a memorandum. 
[242 P.2d at 580]. 
Nor does Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962), 
support Brown's position. In Bunnell, the Court simply held that 
the parties had indeed reached agreement on all the terms of the 
contract. 
Brown's asserts that it was error for Judge Brian to 
dismiss its equitable claim for specific performance before the 
jury ruled on Brown's legal claim for damages based on common 
facts. [Appellants' Brief, p. 46] . Brown's mistakenly argues that 
because Judge Brian was going to allow the issue of whether the BLP 
was enforceable with respect to the initial three-year term of the 
lease to go to the jury before he decided as a matter of law 
whether the BLP was sufficient for recovery of damages, that Judge 
Brian was obligated not to decide the specific performance claim 
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until the jury made its determination. This argument is wrong for 
two reasons. 
First, as the cases cited above demonstrate, an agreement 
may be definite enough for the recovery of damages, but still too 
indefinite for specific performance. Thus, any decision the jury 
would make on damages would not be binding with respect to specific 
performance. It was purely a question of law for the court to 
decide whether the BLP was definite enough to justify specific 
performance. The interpretation of an unambiguous agreement is a 
question of law for the court to decide. The threshold question 
of whether a contract is ambiguous is also a question of law for 
the court. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 559 (Utah App. 1994). 
Even if a contract is ambiguous, the resolution of the ambiguity 
presents a question of law for the court, unless contradictory 
evidence is presented to clarify the ambiguity. Morris v. Mountain 
States Tel & Tel Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1200-01 (Utah 1983); Overson 
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty, 587 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 
1978) . 
There was no claim in the case at bar or tender of any 
evidence that the BLP was ambiguous, nor was any evidence tendered 
of any negotiations or discussions to clarify any purported 
ambiguities. Therefore, the interpretation of the BLP was purely 
a question of law for the court to decide. The court appropriately 
made that decision. 
Second, this argument is moot because Brown's stipulated 
to the dismissal of its claim for damages for breach of the BLP. 
31 
Thus, there were no "common facts" to be decided by the ju ry a t 
t r i a l . 
2. The Tenants Were Indispensable P a r t i e s . 
Brown's contention that the court erred in refusing to 
grant spec i f ic performance because of Brown's f a i l u re to jo in the 
present tenants on the Property i s likewise without mer i t . 5 In 
McLean v. Archer, 201 P.2d 184, 189-90 (Wash. 1948), the court 
recognized the long-standing rule that p a r t i e s whose r i g h t s wi l l 
be d i r e c t l y affected by a decree of specif ic performance must be 
joined as p a r t i e s i f they are subject to the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the 
cour t . The court s t a t ed : 
The fundamental rule that a l l persons whose 
r i g h t s wi l l be d i r e c t l y affected by a decree in equi ty 
must, if within the j u r i sd i c t i on of the court and 
l ega l ly capable of suing or being sued, be joined as 
p a r t i e s p l a i n t i f f or defendant in order tha t complete j u s t i c e may be done and that there may be a f ina l 
determination of the r igh t s of a l l p a r t i e s i n t e r e s t ed 
in the subject matter of the controversy governs the 
questions of pa r t i e s in s u i t s for spec i f ic 
performance. 
See a l so . Wilson v. Thomason, 406 So.2d 871, 872 (Ala. 1981) ; Savin 
v. Rauch, 255 P.2d 206, 209 (Wyo. 1953); Beck v. Adams, 174 P.2d 
134, 137-38 (Wyo. 1946); A. P. Freund Sons v. Vaupll, 202 N.E.2d 
Although Brown's starts out i ts specific performance argument by acknowledging that one of the 
reasons the court dismissed the claim was that the BLP was too uncertain and indefinite to be enforceable. 
Brown's later inconsistently te l ls the court that Judge Brian only dismissed the specific performance claim 
because of the non-joinder of the tenants. [Appellants* Brief, p. 21]. Brown's disingenuously rel ies on a 
single excerpt from the June 11, 1996 hearing in which Judge Brian was exploring what to do with the specific 
performance claim. Judge Brian later made clear on the record of that hearing and in his Findings and 
Conclusions that the specific performance claim was dismissed, f i r s t , because i t was too indefinite and 
uncertain, and, second, because of the non-joinder of the tenants. [R. 1294-96, 1424]. 
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350, 352 (111. 1964). See also, 81AC.J.S. Specific Performance. 
§ 136. 
The only case cited by Brown's in support of its argument 
that the tenants were not indispensable parties is Helzberg's 
Diamond Shops, Inc. v. Valley West Pes Moines Shopping Center, 
Inc. , 546 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1977) . Helzberg's is easily 
distinguished. There, the Court recognized that the tenant was 
required to be joined as a party if possible. However, the tenant 
was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the court. 
Furthermore, the trial court had afforded the tenant an opportunity 
to intervene in the action to protect its interests. It was in 
that context that the Eighth Circuit held the district court had 
not committed error in proceeding in the absence of the tenant. 
Brown's also argues that any dismissal for non-joinder 
should have been without prejudice. If Brown's contention is 
correct, then Brown's could have forced 33 0 Partners to go to trial 
on the damage claims and then have to come back for a second trial 
at a later time on the claim for specific performance. In this 
regard, Brown's did not seek leave to bring in the tenants as 
parties. 
The only case cited by Brown's for its argument that the 
dismissal should have been without prejudice involved far different 
facts. In Bonneville Tower Condominium Management Comm. v. 
Thompson Michie Assocs., 728 P.2d 1017 (Utah 1986), cited by 
Brown's, the plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for 
failure to join indispensable parties. The court ordered plaintiff 
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to amend its complaint to add the indispensable parties as 
defendants on two occasions and indicated that if the parties were 
not joined, the case would be dismissed. Plaintiff elected to 
stand on its complaint and the trial court then dismissed the 
action with prejudice. The dismissal was entered at the outset of 
the case, not at trial, as in the present case. 
C. THE BLP DID NOT OBLIGATE 33 0 PARTNERS TO NEGOTIATE A 
LEASE IN GOOD FAITH. 
Brown's contends that even if the BLP was not a binding 
lease, the document somehow gave rise to a covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing obligating Defendants to negotiate a lease in good 
faith. In other words, Brown's contends that the BLP was not an 
implied agreement to agree, but an implied agreement to negotiate! 
There is no basis for the implication of such a covenant. 
In order for a covenant of good faith and fair dealing to 
exist, there must be a contractual relationship between the 
parties. Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 921 (Utah 1993) . A 
covenant of good faith cannot create an agreement where none 
existed or supply terms to which the parties have not assented. 
Atchison Casting Corp. v. Dofasco, Inc., 889 F.Supp. 1445, 1457 
(D.Kan. 1995) . The courts have routinely held that unless and 
until a final agreement is reached, parties are free to break off 
negotiations at any time even if they have previously agreed to 
some of the terms of an agreement. See, e.g., Gasmark Ltd. v. 
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Kimball Energy Corp., 868 S.W.2d 925, 929 (Tex. App. 1994); McGinn 
v. American Bank Stationary Co., 195 A.2d 615, 616 (Mary. 1963) . 
Thus, in Trustee's of the First Pres. Church v. Howard Co. 
Jewelers, 97 A.2d 144, 146 (N.J. 1953), the court stated: 
It is a well-established principle of contract 
law that . . . until the actual completion of the 
bargain, either party is at liberty to withdraw his 
consent and put an end to the negotiation. . . . 
From all the circumstances it seems reasonably 
clear that both parties considered that many terms 
remained to be agreed upon despite the fact that the 
basic terms, the length of the lease and the amount 
of rent, had been definitely settled. It is common 
experience that the lease of a valuable piece of 
property such as this is never based solely upon the 
length of the term or rental alone, and until there 
is an agreement as to the other essential terms 
usually found in such a lease and ordinarily 
formalized in the writing, no binding contract exists. 
In the case at bar, there is no express provision in the 
BLP whereby the parties obligated themselves to negotiate a lease 
in good faith. Brown's wants this court to imply such a provision 
into the document simply because the parties had reached a 
preliminary understanding on a few of the terms of the lease. The 
case law does not support such an implication. Indeed, even if the 
parties had agreed to negotiate in good faith, such an agreement 
would have been too vague and indefinite to be enforced. In Candid 
Productions v. International Skating Union, 530 F.Supp. 1330, 1336 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), the court granted summary judgment dismissing a 
claim that the defendant had breached an express agreement to 
negotiate in good faith because that agreement was too vague and 
indefinite to be enforced, observing: 
While the power of the Court to fashion in 
appropriate case an equitable remedy is great, it does 
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not encompass the right to make an agreement for the 
parties. To issue a decree of specific performance, 
as plaintiff requests, would require the Court to 
enter into the realm of the conjectural. An agreement 
to negotiate in good faith is even more vague than an 
agreement to agree. An agreement to negotiate in good 
faith is amorphous and nebulous, since it implicates 
so many factors that are themselves indefinite and 
uncertain that the intent of the parties can only be 
fathomed by conjecture and surmise. 
In Reprosystem B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257 (2nd Cir. 
1984), the Second Circuit refused to imply an obligation to 
negotiate in good faith. The Second Circuit held that because the 
parties did not intend to be bound to an agreement unless and until 
a formal written agreement was signed, there was no agreement 
between the parties and thus no obligation to negotiate a final 
agreement in good faith. The court stated that: "Whatever implied 
agreement that existed was too indefinite" for the court to 
enforce. 
In the case at bar, if the court were to imply an 
obligation to negotiate in good faith, when were the parties 
obligated to start negotiations (they did not even do so for 
several months)? How long would Brown's have to wait for 330 
Partners to complete the plans for the building, obtain 
governmental approvals for the building, obtain financing for 
construction and obtain a construction contract so that Brown's 
would have a reasonable idea of when the building would be finished 
before Brown's was freed of its obligation to negotiate and free 
to pursue other properties? How long would negotiations have to 
last; would the parties have to agree on reasonable terms with 
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respect to all of the matters that had not been agreed upon, or 
were the parties free to negotiate whatever terms they could, as 
in normal contract negotiations? Were the parties free to 
negotiate more favorable terms on certain provisions to compensate 
for concessions made on other provisions in the lease? These and 
many other similar questions counsel against the implication of an 
implied covenant to negotiate in good faith in the present case. 
Brown's relies upon Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 
F.2d 291 (3rd Cir. 1986), to support its claim that 330 Partners 
was obligated to negotiate the remaining lease terms in good faith. 
Grossman is, however, distinguishable because in that case the 
landlord unambiguously agreed in writing to "withdraw the store 
from the rental market and only negotiate the above-described 
leasing transaction to completion." The court held that this 
constituted an enforceable express obligation to negotiate in good 
faith and therefore the landlord's failure to negotiate and his 
entering into a lease with a third party constituted a breach of 
that obligation. 
Brown's once again cites Kier v. Condrack, supra, for its 
good faith argument, arguing that it establishes "an extraordinary 
duty to negotiate missing terms in agreements in good faith." Kier 
does no such thing. Kier only establishes that if a buyer has an 
option to purchase property for a specific sum "on payments and 
terms to be negotiated, " the seller cannot refuse to sell just 
because he has decided not to when the buyer is willing to pay the 
entire option price in cash. 
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Most importantly, Brown's good faith argument flies in the 
face of the Utah Supreme Court's decisions in Pingree, Cottonwood 
Mall and Tsern that a court will not imply a reasonable rental rate 
to renew or modify leases. And, contrary to Brown's argument, 
there is no indication in Pingree, Cottonwood Mall or Tsern that 
the parties had already engaged in good faith negotiations. 
D. 330 PARTNERS DID ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE A LEASE IN GOOD 
FAITH. 
Even were the Court to rule on some basis that 33 0 Partners 
had an obligation to negotiate in good faith for a final lease, the 
evidence demonstrates that 33 0 Partners did so. 
It was undisputed that all of the negotiations between the 
parties for a lease were in writing. Those negotiations took place 
during the latter part of 1994 and early 1995. 330 Partners 
submitted a proposed lease to Brown's. Brown's attorney, Thomas 
Green, then wrote his October 27, 1994 letter demanding over thirty 
changes in the lease. 330 Partners agreed to some of the changes, 
but refused others. Then, in the spring of 1995, Brown's submitted 
a proposed lease to 330 Partners. However, the parties were unable 
to agree on the terms of the lease and negotiations terminated. 
Brown's conceded that many of these items were normal disagreements 
between a landlord and tenant. [R. 917-44, 964-81]. 
Brown's contention that 330 Partners did not negotiate in 
good faith is based upon nothing more than the fact that 33 0 
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Partners did not consider the BLP to be binding and that 33 0 
Partners wanted the BLP signed for financing purposes. Brown's 
expert testified, however, that is the normal purpose for such a 
document and that 50% of the time such documents don't result in 
a final agreement between the parties. [R. 958-59, 961]. 
E. AS A MATTER OF LAW, BROWN'S SUFFERED NO DAMAGES AS A 
RESULT OF DEFENDANTS' ALLEGED FAILURE TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH. 
In addition to the fact that no implied obligation to 
negotiate in good faith existed, Defendants were entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law on the good faith and fair dealing 
claim because, even if it is assumed for argument that Defendants 
were obligated to negotiate a lease in good faith and failed to do 
so, Brown's suffered no damage from that failure as a matter of 
law. 
As set forth above, Brown's specifically stipulated at 
trial that Tom Brown's testimony that he would not have agreed to 
lease the Property for only three years and that he required a 
lease of at least two option periods of three years each was true 
testimony and accurately stated Brown's position in this lawsuit. 
Based upon that stipulation, Brown's moved for a dismissal of its 
claim for breach of the BLP for the initial three-year term. [R. 
1267-1269] . Moreover, once again, Tom Brown testified that Brown's 
would not have entered into a lease unless 33 0 Partners agreed to 
all of the more than thirty changes demanded by Brown's counsel in 
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October, 1994, including a provision that set the percentage rental 
during the option periods. Brown's thus was unwilling to comply 
with the specific provision of the BLP which only obligated 330 
Partners to agree on the rent in the option periods prior to the 
commencement of each option period. 
Accordingly, even if 33 0 Partners would have acceded to 
every demand made by Brown's except the demand to agree in advance 
to the rental to be paid during the option periods, which 33 0 
Partners was plainly not obligated to do, Brown's would not have 
entered into a lease. Simply put, Brown's itself was not willing 
to live with the BLP. Therefore, any supposed failure of 33 0 
Partners to negotiate in good faith caused Brown's no damage. 
F. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED BROWN'S GENERAL 
OFFICES CLAIMS TO RECOVER MONEY THAT IT ALLEGEDLY WOULD HAVE EARNED 
UNDER A SERVICES AGREEMENT WITH THE PARTNERSHIP TENANT. 
The trial court correctly found that: 
15. Brown's General Offices was not a named 
signatory to the Basic Lease Provisions document, was 
not intended to be named signatory to any final lease 
agreement, if any could be reached, nor was it to be 
a tenant in the subject building. [R. 1422]. 
Brown's has not challenged that finding. Based on this 
finding, the court determined that as a matter of law Brown's 
General Offices' claim (asserted for the first time in a damage 
study prepared and served shortly before trial) that it was 
entitled to recover damages based upon a management agreement it 
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allegedly would have entered into with the proposed tenant, the 
Brown's Shoe Fit partnership, was barred as a matter of law. This 
ruling was perfectly correct. If 330 Partners were liable at all 
(which it is not), it would be liable to the tenant partnership not 
to the individual partners. 
In the first place, there was no allegation of this item 
of special damages in Brown's Complaint. Special damages must be 
pled in the Complaint to be recoverable. Ranch Homes, Inc. v. 
Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah 1979). 
In the second place, there is absolutely no evidence or 
claim that Brown's General Offices, Inc. was a third party 
beneficiary of the BLP. 
Brown's attempts to argue that Brown's General Offices was 
in privity with 330 Partners because it was a partner in Brown's 
Shoe Fit Company and therefore can recover whatever damages it 
suffered as a result of a supposed breach of the BLP. Brown's 
General Offices, however, was not a party to the BLP. The cases 
cited by Brown's do not support this contention. 
Brown's first cites Cottonwood Mall Company v. Sine, supra, 
for the proposition that "partners are entitled to enforce a 
partnership contract with a third party." [Appellant's Brief, p. 
45]. All Cottonwood Mall held was that a joint venture could sue 
in its own name to recover possession of space in its shopping mall 
occupied by the defendant. 
Brown's next miscites Haynes v. Therrien, No. L-89-306, 
1990 Ohio App. Lexis 4494\*7 (Ohio App. 1990), and In Re Camhi, 
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208 N.Y.S. 2d 162 (I960), for the proposition that "partners are 
considered to be in privity of contract with the third party, since 
partners are both liable for the contractual duties, and entitled 
to enforce its obligation." [Appellants' Brief, p. 45]. Neither 
case has any significance to the issue under review in the present 
case. In Haynes, the Court only held that a consent judgment in 
a prior real property forfeiture action with respect to real estate 
purchased by a partnership was entitled to collateral estoppel 
effect in a later case filed by a partner in the partnership who 
was in privity with the partnership. In Camhi, the Court merely 
held that a partner was bound by an arbitration clause in an 
agreement signed by the partnership even though he had not 
personally signed the agreement. 
Brown's also miscites Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 
1984), for the proposition that "where one partner has suffered 
damages distinct from those of the partnership or other partners, 
that partner can recover those damages in addition to those 
incurred by the partnership or other partners." [Appellants' 
Brief, p. 46]. Kemp stands for no such proposition. 
In Kemp, plaintiff, who was an individual member of a joint 
venture, commenced suit for interference with contract and 
prospective economic advantage and breach of contract to recover 
his 15% share of the damages suffered by the joint venture. This 
Court held that an individual joint venturer may not sue in his own 
name to enforce a liability owed to the joint venture and therefore 
affirmed the dismissal of the compliant for failure to join an 
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indispensable party. This court did not hold that a partner can 
sue for injuries he suffers as a result of a breach of contract 
with the partnership. The Court only noted, in dicta, that 
plaintiff could not sue directly unless he "could show that he 
suffered direct injury personally, as distinguished from injury to 
the partnership. . . . " [680 P.2d at 760]. 
Finally, there was not even any contention in this case 
that Brown's gave 330 Partners notice of any special circumstances 
that Brown's General Offices would enter into a management contract 
for which it would be paid service fees. Thus, even if such 
damages could otherwise be recovered by Brown's General Offices, 
the damages are not recoverable because they were not a foreseeable 
result of the alleged breach of the BLP. See, Saunders v. Sharp, 
840 P.2d 796, 809 (Utah 1992). 
G. THE COURT PROPERLY MADE FINDINGS OF UNDISPUTED FACT. 
Brown's argues that Finding No. 12 is an improper finding 
of undisputed fact. That finding states: 
12. During the fall of 1994 and early 1995 the 
parties exchanged correspondence and drafts of 
proposed lease agreements for the Property, but no 
final lease agreement was ever agreed to or entered 
into between the parties. In this connection, 
Plaintiffs requested a provision in the lease which, 
unlike the Basic Lease Provisions document, provided 
a mechanism for appraisers to set the rent during the 
option periods if the parties could not agree. [R. 
1421-1422]. 
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Brown's claims that it was error for the court to make this 
determination based upon the parties' trial briefs, arguments of 
counsel and the stipulation of Tom Brown's testimony contained in 
Finding No. 14. This argument does not accurately reflect the 
record. 
330 Partners had previously filed a motion for summary 
judgment referring extensively to the deposition testimony of Tom 
Brown and his attorney, Thomas Green. That motion and the portions 
of those depositions were part of the record in this case at the 
time of trial. The testimony of Tom Brown and his attorney, Thomas 
Green, fully support Finding No. 12. Indeed, the negotiations 
between the parties were all conducted in writing and copies of the 
correspondence and proposed leases exchanged between the parties 
were attached as exhibits to Brown's Complaint. [R. 2-66]. Thus, 
there could be no dispute as to what the negotiations were. Green 
received a draft lease from 33 0 Partners' attorney and then 
demanded in his October 27, 1994 letter over thirty changes to that 
document. Tom Brown testified he would not enter into a lease 
unless all of those changes were made. Moreover, in early 1995, 
Brown's submitted its own proposed lease agreement which, contrary 
to the specific provisions of the BLP, contained a mechanism for 
appraisers to set the rent during the option periods if the parties 
could not agree. [R. 3, 1 13.5]. These facts were before the 
court in the form of admissions of the Brown's representative in 
deposition testimony and undisputed documents and the court's 
finding based thereon was perfectly proper. 
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In this connection, all parties understood that the hearing 
on June 11, 1996 at the commencement of trial would effectively be 
a motion for summary judgment. Thus, on June 6, 1996, at a 
previous hearing on the legal issues, the following exchange 
occurred between counsel and the court: 
The Court: . . . If there is going to be matters 
after carefully reviewing the law that clearly fall 
within the purview of the court to decide, as opposed 
to the jury, then it is this court's feeling that we 
ought to make those decisions, whatever they may be, 
and proceed only with factual matters for the jury to 
decide. I would suggest that you -- if you think 
there is any other law more persuasive than what you 
have cited in your pleading thus far, give it to me 
before the weekend, so I can read it. And I would 
like to have two hours of argument on the questions 
Tuesday, June 11th. 
Mr. Van Dam: Sounds like what we are going to 
be doing is kind of arguing summary judgment on 
Tuesday. We have had very little time. We never 
researched nor responded to their motion for summary 
judgment. In the context of trying to prepare for 
this trial that's an enormous burden on us. 
Mr. Burbidge: I got to tell you, I have seen the 
briefs everybody has filed. Everybody is on top of 
that issue. They have drafted their jury 
instructions. So both of these sides have researched 
the cases, understand the cases, have drawn their jury 
instructions. There won't be any surprises on the 
cases or the argument. We are ready to go. Both 
sides are ready to go. 
The Court: I am inclined -- and careful 
reflection -- I am inclined to spend a couple of 
hours. I will be very familiar with all of the law 
that's cited. And we will see where this summary 
judgment argument, if that's what you want to label 
it, takes us Tuesday morning. [R. 1569-1570] 
[Emphasis added]. 
The court's action in deciding the legal issues at the 
commencement of trial was perfectly proper. Crucially, Brown's has 
not appealed on the basis that the court had no authority to 
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conduct such a hearing at the commencement of trial. Such an 
argument would have been groundless. The court was perfectly 
entitled to make legal decisions at the commencement of trial, just 
as the court would have been entitled to grant judgment based upon 
Brown's opening statement or to grant a directed verdict at the 
conclusion of Brown's case. 
Moreover, any irregularity in this procedure was harmless. 
In Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991), the 
court granted a summary judgment that was filed four days before 
trial (one business day) and heard the morning of trial. The 
opposing party had not even had the chance to file an opposing 
memorandum. The court held that although Rule 56 was not followed, 
any error was harmless because there was no showing of a likelihood 
of a different outcome if Rule 56 had been followed. See also, 
Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1181 (Utah 1993); Equitable Life 
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993). 
In the present case, the parties had fully briefed all the 
legal issues, both in their trial briefs and in memoranda filed 
with the court with reference to the specific hearing. There has 
not been and could not be any showing of a likelihood of a 
different result. The court's decisions were based upon undisputed 
documents and Brown's own testimony. Moreover, Brown's did not 
request additional time in order to brief any issues or file 
affidavits, but participated in the June 11, 1996 hearing at the 
commencement of trial. Indeed, in that hearing, Brown's obtained 
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the dismissal of the claims asserted by 330 Partners in its 
Counterclaim. 
H. THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED BROWN'S FRAUD CLAIM. 
The trial court found that both parties contemplated that 
before Brownfs occupied the Property a final lease document would 
be executed and the terms agreed to in the BLP would be 
incorporated into that document. [Finding No. 5]. The court 
concluded as a matter of law that Brown's fraud claim was 
insufficient because: (1) there was no misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact; (2) Brown's could not reasonably rely on 
the claimed misrepresentation; and (3) Brown's suffered no damages 
as a result of the claimed misrepresentation. The court's ruling 
is perfectly appropriate under the applicable law and the record 
in this case. 
In the first place, the supposed fact that was 
misrepresented was 330 Partners' failure to disclose to Brown's 
that it allegedly had no intent to be bound by the BLP. However, 
the BLP specifically provides that the parties are going to attempt 
to negotiate a final lease agreement containing all of the terms 
of a lease and that the terms of the BLP would simply be 
incorporated into that document. As demonstrated earlier, neither 
side intended to be bound unless and until a final lease was 
signed. There was no basis for any contention that at the time 
the BLP was entered into that 33 0 Partners did not intend to 
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attempt to negotiate a final lease incorporating the terms. The 
fact that 33 0 Partners may have intended to use the BLP to obtain 
financing is irrelevant. Brown's was well aware of that fact. 
Brown's own expert opined that is the normal purpose of such a 
document and that 50% of the time such preliminary documents do not 
result in a final agreement. 
Moreover, as a matter of law, Brown's could not reasonably 
have relied upon the claimed misrepresentation, both because the 
terms of the BLP were too vague, uncertain and incomplete to permit 
such reliance and because of Tom Brown's testimony that Brown's 
would not have leased the Property pursuant to the terms of the 
BLP. Again, Tom Brown specifically testified that without binding 
agreements for the two three-year option periods, he would not have 
leased the Property. As demonstrated above, and as found by the 
court, no binding agreement for the option periods existed. 
Third, for the same reason, Brown's suffered no damages as 
a result of the alleged fact that 330 Partners did not intend to 
be bound by the BLP. See, e .g. , Hickman v. Groesbeck, 3 89 F.Supp. 
769, 779 (D. Utah 1974) ; Mackey & Assoc, v. Russell & Axon Intern., 
819 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Mo. App. 1991). Brown's itself did not intend 
to be bound by the BLP. Brown's was unwilling to leave the option 
periods' rent to future negotiation as provided in the BLP. 
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I. . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING 330 PARTNERS1 
COUNTERCLAIM FOR ABUSE OF PROCESS. 
330 Partners asserted a Counterclaim for abuse of process. 
Brown's filed this lawsuit claiming breach of the BLP despite the 
fact that Brown's knew it was not willing to abide by the terms of 
the BLP (such as they were) because Brown's knew it was not willing 
to lease the Property for the initial three-year term unless 
Brown's had a firm agreement as to the rent to be charged during 
the two three-year option periods. Brown's filed this lawsuit for 
the purpose of attempting to force Defendants into either leasing 
the Property to Brown's on terms to which 33 0 Partners had not 
agreed (not under the terms of the BLP) and to which 33 0 Partners 
was not obligated to agree, or to pay Brown's blood money to settle 
the lawsuit. 
The use of legal process to accomplish an improper purpose, 
such as compelling a person to do so something which he would not 
otherwise be legally obligated to do, constitutes an abuse of 
process. Crease v. Pleasant Grove City, 519 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah 
1974); Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 308-09 
(Utah 1982) ; Keller v. Rav, Ouinney & Nebeker, 896 F.Supp. 1563 (D. 
Utah 1995) . An action for abuse of process may be brought as a 
counterclaim. Keller, 896 F.Supp at 1570, n. 15; Smith v. Buicich, 
699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985). The evidence that this case was filed 
for an improper purpose was sufficient to require that this claim 
be decided by the jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the order of the trial court dismissing Brown's Complaint 
should be affirmed in all respects. The Order dismissing 
Defendants1 Counterclaim should be reversed and that claim remanded 
for trial. 
DATED nk this /£)' aay of July, 1997. 
BURBIDGE &^MTSCHELL 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Jon Olch and Janet OjLch 
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